POSITION PAPER ON JOINT TASK FORCE-NIGERIA (JTF-N) RESOURCE ANALYSIS

Maj Dolly Hutagalung/ACSC AY24/Flight 13/JC-601E 

1.  Purpose: Identify troop-to-task resource needs required to accomplish JTF-N’s essential and specific tasks. The planning cell during the mission analysis phase determined one line of operation (LOO): defeat VEOs, and two lines of effort (LOE): the NAF-led internal security, and influence and support Nigeria's stability. JTF-N needs to allocate sufficient resources in the form of the most appropriate Force Package (FP) to complete the tasks. 

a.  The primary issues in Nigeria are the presence of aggressive violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and natural disasters in the region, both of which significantly raise the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and promote instability in the Government of Nigeria (GoN). Natural disasters are more difficult to foresee than VEO activities, hence VEO elimination is a top priority objective for JTF-N together with GoN. 

b.   This paper focuses on justifying FP 1's competence to complete tasks following LOO and LOEs, identifying capability gaps, and making recommendations for strengthening overall JTF-N planning.

 

2.   Discussion: 

a.  Justification: FP 1 focuses on the use of forces from the U.S. Army (1^st and 3^rd Battalion of 3^rd Special Forces Group [SFG], and 82^nd Airborne Immediate Response Force [IRF] Battalion), U.S. Air Force (352^nd Special Operations Wing), and U.S. Marine Corps (Marine Expeditionary Unit [MEU]), which are well suited to dealing with VEOs, especially those in densely populated urban areas. 

(1)  Aside from strong penetration capabilities into hostile territory, SOF have flexible capabilities that allow them to build partner capacities such as foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and counterinsurgency.[i] In this case, strengthening the capabilities of the NAF through train, advise, and assist (TAA) missions.   

 (2)  The MEU plays an essential role in supporting the eradication of VEO with its Ground Combat Element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE); moreover, it is capable of carrying out support and HADR operations with its elements.[ii]

 (3)  To achieve the desired end state, JTF-N must complete all objectives following planning. In fact, FP 1 focuses on defeating VEOs, while other objectives will receive less resource allocation. However, this must be executed so that VEOs, the main cause of instability in Nigeria, can be handled first before focusing on other objectives. Focusing on defeating VEOs does not imply abandoning other objectives. It is merely that the force allocation is modified based on priority. Additionally, a lack of forces in other tasks can be recovered by optimizing NAF with assistance from FP 1 elements.

 (4)  The massive employment of offensive forces in fighting VEOs has the potential to cause significant damage and casualties among friendly forces, opponents, and civilians. This will generate concerns within Nigeria, globally, and among U.S. citizens, possibly risking the mission's success. However, JTF-N must use a high number of forces to expedite the process of defeating VEOs and avoid a protracted fight that would result in more casualties and expenses. Aside from that, the quicker the VEOs get neutralized, the faster the operational focus shifts to other objectives. 

b.   Views of Others: Conversely, FP 2 contributes personnel more adept at conducting stabilization operations that bolster the capabilities of the NAF. FP 2 consists of the U.S. Army (2^nd Security Force Assistance Brigade [SFAB] and California National Guard [CANG]), additionally the U.S. Air Force (621^st Contingency Response Group [CRG] and Berry Aviation). 

(1)  SFAB offers comprehensive training for small and distributed operations, as well as expertise in global military training.[iii] This capability is very suitable for strengthening the capabilities of the NAF. However, improving the NAF's ability to conduct self-sufficient operations to counter VEO dominance and strengthen internal security will take a long period. Meanwhile, VEO's influence will spread further, making Nigeria's situation even worse.

 (2)  CANG has the potential for disaster relief, as well as support to civil authorities, which may provide a variety of services during a crisis, such as transportation, communications, engineering, and medical assistance. However, this capacity is ineffective in dealing with VEO, which is the primary source of problems in Nigeria. As long as the crisis persists, no amount of assistance provided to Nigeria will be sufficient.

 (3)  On the one hand, the 621^st CRG's capacity meets the needs of the JTF-N by allowing it to rapidly deploy, establish airfield operations, and manage air mobility operations to support global crises and humanitarian missions.[iv] On the other hand, Barry Aviation is dependent on civilian contracts and cannot be deployed to enemy areas to directly combat VEO, which is a drawback for JTF-N. 

c.   Force Allocation: JTF-N prioritized FP 1 to boost efforts to combat VEO, with the remaining supporting capabilities directed to NAF TAA tasks and GoN HADR operations. Assigning units for the following eight tasks: 

(1)  LOO 1 (Defeat VEOs) Essential Tasks: JFLCC destroys VEO equipment, weapon storage, key leaders, and VEO personnel in the vicinity of Borno. 

(a)  Unit: 82^nd Airborne IRF Battalion (70% of this unit), 1^st Battalion of 3^rd SFG, 321^st Special Tactics Squadron (STS), 752^nd Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, supported by MEU ACE (40% of this unit). 

(b)  Justification: The 82^nd Airborne IRF Battalion has the capability for rapid deployment and can conduct a forcible entry to seize key terrain and build up combat power for follow-on operation.[v] The 1^st Battalion of 3^rd SFG and 321^st STS specializes in direct action and unconventional warfare to combat VEO.[vi] Meanwhile, MEU ACE provides air support in the form of air interdiction, airlift, CAS, and ISR.[vii] 

(2)  LOO 1 (Defeat VEOs) Essential Task: JFSOCC attacks the VEO personnel network. 

(a)  Unit: 67^th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), 352^nd Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron. 

(b)  Justification: The 67^th SOS possesses specific reconnaissance capabilities to identify and locate VEO networks, along with sensitive site exploitation actions to dismantle them.[viii] 

(3)  LOO 1 (Defeat VEOs): JFACC conducts air interdiction, CAS, ISR, airspace control, airlift, air defense, and PR. 

(a)  Unit: MEU ACE (60% of this unit). 

(b)  Justification: The MEU ACE has rotary and fixed-wing aircraft capable of providing assault support, offensive air support, and air reconnaissance to ground troops attempting to defeat VEO.[ix] However, MEU ACE has limits in carrying out air operations, it requires additional units from USAFRICOM, such as a rescue group (HH-60G Squadron) for PR missions, and an Air Operations Center (AOC) for airspace control; additionally, Army Avenger Batteries for short-range air defense capability. 

(4)  LOE 2 (Train and advise NAF) Essential Tasks: JFLCC embeds advisors into NAF units to build partner capacity in ground training objectives.

       (a)  Unit: 7^th SOS from 352^nd Special Operations Wing. 

      (b)  Justification: This unit has a foreign internal defense capability to support the house nation by implementing TAA to strengthen the NAF's capabilities and effectiveness in dealing with internal threats such as insurgency, terrorism, and disaster relief.[x] 

(5)  LOE 2 (Train and advise NAF): JFLCC, ICW the NAF, to protect critical infrastructure to prevent utility outages for Nigerian civilians. 

(a)  Unit: MEU GCE (30% of this unit or one infantry regiment). 

(b)  Justification: This unit can conduct defensive operations to support NAF secure critical infrastructure. Due to the scale of priority, however, MEU GCE has a limited amount of personnel to carry out security operations, hence it requires an extra unit from USAFRICOM, specifically the Army PM Brigade, which has force and asset protection capabilities. Besides, this task requires the Army Theater Engineering Command to be able to maintain and repair the infrastructure so that it continues to function properly. 

(6)  LOE 3 (Perform HADR operation with NAF) Essential Tasks: Build, sustain, and secure IDP camps.

(a)  Unit: MEU GCE (70% of this unit or two infantry regiments) and LCE (50% of this unit or one combat logistic battalion) 

(b)  Justification: Both units have HADR operations capabilities and secure IDP camps; additionally, LCE has engineering operations capabilities to build emergency shelters. 

(7)  LOE 3 (Establish ABO): Secure Staging Locations (SPODs/APODs). 

(a)  Unit: 82^nd Airborne IRF Battalion (30% of this unit) supported by MEU LCE (50% of this unit or one combat logistic battalion). 

(b)  Justification: The 82^nd IRF may perform forcible entry operations to seize and secure SPODs/APODs, along with logistical support to maintain robust operational capabilities in difficult circumstances. In Addition, LCE has engineering operations capabilities to build staging locations for follow-on operations. However, both units have a limited amount of personnel to secure and construct SPODs/APODs, therefore it requires an extra unit from USAFRICOM, specifically MEU GCE and LCE from SP-MAGTF-CR, which can safeguard the area while also accelerating the construction. 

(8)  LOE 3 (Develop partner capabilities): Support and influence NAF through TAA. 

(a)  Unit: 3^rd Battalion of 3^rd SFG. 

(b)  Justification: This unit has a foreign internal defense capability to support the house nation by implementing TAA to strengthen the NAF's capabilities and effectiveness in dealing with internal threats such as insurgency, terrorism, and disaster relief. 

3.  Shortfall: FP 1 contains assets that are more suited to fighting VEOs. However, JTF-N has various duties that must be fulfilled to reach the military end state; thus, there is a possibility of finding certain flaws in the implementation of operations. 

      a.   The number of troops in each JTF-N unit is limited in comparison to the number of available tasks, therefore several units must carry out multiple assignments simultaneously, dividing their strength based on the priority scale of the duties. An example of this occurs in the 82^nd Airborne IRF Battalion unit and all elements of the MEU. 

      b.   Force allocation prioritizes essential tasks above specified tasks, resulting in insufficient force allocation for numerous tasks, particularly those connected to securing assets and territory, as well as creating staging areas in the form of SPODs/APODs. 

      c.   FP 1 lacks air and space force units, resulting in air support being heavily reliant on MEU ACE's capabilities, which have limitations in using air power in response to ground force needs, particularly in combating VEO operations.

 

4.   Recommendation:

 

a.   FP 1 is the best option for JTF-N to attain military objectives, as long as all personnel and unit shortages are addressed so that operations can be carried out more successfully. 

b.  Defeating VEO must be a top priority for the issue to be overcome swiftly. Following that, the emphasis of operations can shift to strengthening the NAF to ensure internal security. Simultaneously, JTF-N also influences and fosters Nigerian stability through HADR, guaranteeing that all operational objectives are met as planned.

NOTES

 

I want to thank our Joint Campaign Instructor, LtCol Mark Muller, Maj. Christopher Nguyen, Maj Michael McDonald, and all the students of Flight 13 for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found therein are my own.

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[i]. Joseph E. Osborne, "Joint Special Operations" (lecture, ACSC AY24, Air University, Alabama, April 2, 2024).

[ii]. MEU Capability Brief PPT.

[iii]. Air Command and Staff College, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Primer (Department of Joint Warfighting, 2024), 63.

[iv]. Ibid, 5.

[v]. Army.mil, "82nd Airborne Division," Swagger Lume API, accessed April 11, 2024, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/05/09/03e83215/82nd-media-packet-new-upated-2.pdf.

[vi]. Air Command and Staff College, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Primer, 24.

[vii]. MEU Capability Brief PPT.

[viii]. Air Command and Staff College, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Primer, 24.

[ix]. MEU Capability Brief PPT.

[x]. Air Command and Staff College, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Primer, 24.