Major Dolly J. P. Hutagalung/Flight 13/AO-902 Final Essay/December 12th, 2023
Bomber
aircraft have been an icon of U.S. air power since the Second World War. Throughout
its evolution, military strategists attempted to use air power to play a more
prominent role, not merely as a support. Ultimately, its capacity for
strategic bombardment operations distinguished it from the other forces and
established an independent air force.
Even former British prime minister Stanley Baldwin once said, “The bomber will always get through.”[i] Unfortunately, the notion has lost relevance in light of the protracted history of military engagements involving the U.S. and its allies and the anticipated complexities of forthcoming conflicts. Contrarily, this is no longer the case according to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendal, who intends to acquire 100 B-21s to meet emergent challenges and believes that the function of bombers in the Air Force will become more significant.[ii] Therefore, the ratio of fighters to bombers should remain constant despite the critical nature of bomber requirements, as their procurement should not compromise budgetary resources allocated for the development of future conflicts, including limited wars, the execution of joint operations, or the attainment of political objectives.
The
Air Force's requirement for bombers escalated in light of the possibility of
conflict with peer competitors in the Pacific. For various reasons,
utilizing bombers like the B-21 is more effective in assaulting the most heavily
guarded surface warships. Bomber aircraft have the range, speed, and sensors to
cover and keep enormous portions of the ocean at risk on a single mission.[iii] Unfortunately,
the arrival of that capability will still take years, as plans call for the
first 100 B-21s to be purchased by approximately 2023, implying a maximum
annual rate of 10-12 each year.[iv] The
bad news is that conflict in the Pacific could occur at any time. If the Air
Force does not rapidly recoup its air power capabilities, it will diminish the
U.S.'s deterrence effect in the region, which may change the opponent's
calculus to wage war. Therefore, optimizing existing bomber aircraft is a more
urgent priority while waiting for the B-21 project's readiness progress. The
strategy to acquire B-21 bombers to address the Pacific conflict is
commendable; nevertheless, modifications to the plan are necessary due to the
protracted procurement period compared to the impending conflict.
The
dynamics of conflict that have occurred in the past, currently, and in the
future tend towards limited war. A limited war is a war with limited aims or
military objectives due to political restraint.[v] A
current instance of a limited war is the hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine.
The term is widely used to refer to contemporary "mutations" of
conflicts in which traditional categories such as "war" no longer
sufficiently encompass the situation's complexities.[vi] Under
these circumstances, the effectiveness of air power is significantly
diminished, mainly due to the absence of air superiority by either side. Besides,
limited war requires limited air power capable of carrying several bombs to
attack strategic targets; then, with the emergence of precision-guided
munitions (PGM) technology, one bomb can destroy one target, and one aircraft
can carry many bombs. As an illustration, during the 2003 Second Gulf War, the B-2
bomber could transport 80 bombs to engage 80 specific targets in each sortie
conducted daily.[vii]
PGMs lowered the requirement for bombs and then reduced the need for bombers. Although
the bomber has strategic capabilities, it is not appropriate for all types and stages
of combat. Furthermore, obtaining air superiority requires more than just
aircraft; it also necessitates cooperation, which is carried out as a joint
operation.
Future
conflict challenges require more joint operations by synergizing multiple domains
rather than the solo role of the service. Currently, the U.S. is developing a
joint operations concept called Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). JADC2
entails creating a sophisticated network of linked sensors and
machine-to-machine interfaces that integrate service components, allies,
partner nations, and kinetic/non-kinetic warfare domains.[viii]
In this case, bombers can play a vital role in operations alongside other
assets. However, depending on the operation's goals, it may not involve any
bombers. In addition, the main task of the Air Force is to achieve and maintain
air superiority during military operations. This state is used for follow-up
air operations and helps other military operations by allowing for freedom of maneuver
in the land and sea domains. As a result, the presence of bombers in the Air
Force must be capable of fostering cross-domain collaboration to meet the
aims of joint military operations. Each force involved in joint operation must
be focused on mission achievement, putting unit egos aside and avoiding inter-service
rivalry.
Additionally,
even a bomber as sophisticated as the B-21 still needs support from other
components to carry out its mission. The bomber aims to destroy strategic
objects during the follow-up air operation. Although PGMs produce high
precision, it is useless if the destruction of the target does not have a
strategic effect. Consequently, providing information about correctly selected
targets via intelligence is critical, necessitating capable intelligence
technology. Moreover, space satellite support and forward aircraft controller
personnel can aid in target identification and are elements of joint
operations. The bomber requires assistance from other components to ensure the
successful execution of the mission, particularly in generating strategic
effects that align with political objectives.
Military
operations aim to achieve the political goals the political leader declares. As
Clausewitz said, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”[ix] Since
the Second World War, the U.S. has been involved in various wars, ranging from
the Korean War to the Vietnam War to the Middle East conflict. Whether nations
win or lose, history has recorded that air power alone cannot achieve political
objectives.[x]
Learning from this, the military procurement must prioritize mission above
function so that it may use any platform to achieve political goals in a war. Besides,
if the Pacific conflict breaks out, the U.S. and its allies will likely avoid
hitting mainland China on purpose so that the fight does not escalate vertically.[xi]
As a result, strategic targets will become increasingly scarce, reducing the
necessity for bombers. The deployment of bombers, along with other elements in
military operations, must support the attainment of political objectives for
the war to be curtailed.
In
addition, improperly utilizing air power, including bombers, can escalate a
conflict. Bombers have certain superior functions that other assets do not
have, such as providing a strategic effect by destroying vital objects so that
the enemy becomes reluctant to continue the war. However, excessive employment
of bombers, on the other hand, may cause collateral damage and raise avoidable
casualties, potentially leading to a loss of local and international political
support. The current battle in Palestine is a striking example, in which Israel
employs excessive air power by raining thousands of bombs on the city of Gaza
to bring down several Hamas insurgents who were hiding, resulting in
the deaths of more than ten thousand innocent children and women.[xii] This
situation might get worse if a bomber capable of carrying a larger quantity
of bombs is used. Bombers, being significant Air Force assets, must be
utilized as needed, and military authorities must
prioritize executing missions that are consistent with political
objectives while minimizing the loss of innocent lives to maintain
political support for the war.
To
summarise, bomber aircraft have been part of the U.S. air power's identity for
a long time. In the early days of the independent Air Force, its strategic
bombing capabilities made the USAF different from other services. However, the
evolution of technology and the character of warfare has reduced the role of
bombers, who are now more focused on joint operations involving multiple
domains. The USAF needs bomber aircraft, but this does not change the
ratio of fighters to bombers in response to probable future
conflicts, carrying out joint operations, and achieving the country's political
objectives. Furthermore, it is only natural that future crises will differ from
those of the present, necessitating various strategies that will influence the
alteration of the combat platform. The primary determinant is the leader's
dedication to prioritizing goal attainment and the military organization's
agility in adapting to eliminate dependence on particular platforms, such as
bombers.
Notes
I wish to thank our Course Instructor, Lt Col. John Chamberlin, Maj. Christopher Nguyen, Maj. Christina Hayhurst and all the students of Flight 13 for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found therein are my own.
[i]. Colin
S. Gray, "Strategic History I: Sagittarius Rising, 1903–39," in
Airpower for Strategic Effect (Alabama: Air University Press, 2012), 106.
[ii]. John A. Tirpak, "Kendall: Ratio of Fighters to Bombers May Shift Toward Bombers in the Future," Air & Space Forces Magazine, last modified May 2, 2023.
[iii]. Robert Haddick, "Thwarting a Chinese Fait Accompli" in Fire on the Water Second Edition: China America and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 179-180.
[iv]. Tirpak, " Kendall: Ratio of Fighters to Bombers May Shift Toward Bombers in the Future."
[v]. Carl V. Clausewitz, "War Plans," in On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 601-602.
[vii]. David Deptula, "Lessons From Planning/Executing the Desert Storm Air Campaign" (lecture, Air Command and Staff College AY24, Air University, Montgomery, November 16, 2023).
[viii]. Thomas L. Cantrell, "Uncertainty Quantification Deep Neural Networks Restrategizing Digitalization in the Military JADC2 Culture at the Operational Level of War Empathy in the Foundations of Warfare," Air & Space Operations Review 2, no. 1 (n.d.), 44-45.
[ix]. Carl V. Clausewitz, "What Is War?," 87-88.
[x]. John A. Olsen, A History of Air Warfare (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2010).
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