Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s Strategies Undertaken on Russia’s Operations in Crimea

 Major Kresna Hendra Wibawa / Flight 17 / MT-601 / 15 September 2023

According to Sun Tzu’s statement, the pinnacle of expertise is to subjugate the adversary without fighting, to conquer cities without attacking them, and to overturn the opponent’s state without protracted operation.[1] Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 revealed Russian invasion expertise in putting what Sun Tzu has provided into practice. The annexation of Crimea, often described as a “bloodless invasion,” in the absence of any recorded Russian fatalities, it is estimated that there were around six associated deaths.[2] Besides that, Warfighting did not take place in Crimea.[3] Even more intriguing is the rapid pace of the process, which began on February 20 and was essentially completed on March 26, 2014.[4] It executed a geopolitical maneuver that embodied the timeless principles of military strategy and statecraft as articulated by two of history’s most influential military theorists: not only Sun Tzu but also Carls von Clausewitz. This essay will examine Sun Tzu’s theories of opportunism and subduing the enemy will, as well as Clausewitz’s theories of the cunning and the culmination point applied in Russian attempts to annex Crimea.

            Sun Tzu’s theory of opportunism finds striking relevance in Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In his most famous book, “The Art of War,” Sun Tzu explains that a smart strategy is to remain invisible and wait until the adversary becomes vulnerable.[5] Furthermore, momentum and timing in deciding to attack is the potential key to winning the battle.[6] Russia recognized the chaos following Ukraine’s political upheaval and the ousting of President Yanukovych as an opportunity to advance its interest in Crimea.[7] By assessing the instability and uncertainty, which indicates it was the adversary’s vulnerable point, allowing Russia to annex Crimea quickly before the international community could come up with a unified reaction. As a result, the opportunity has proven quite lucrative and gives the Russians several advantages in starting their operation.

            In addition to the Sun Tzu theory described before, another theory that is particularly significant when examining the case of Crimea annexation is the notion of subduing the adversary’s will. This principle emphasizes the psychological aspect of warfare and the importance of breaking the opponent’s will.[8] Russia used a complex approach that included not only military power but also a determined attempt to weaken Ukraine’s will to fight. Russia produced an atmosphere of uncertainty and conflict via a well-coordinated campaign of information warfare, propaganda, and misinformation, spreading doubt among Ukrainians and eroding their determination to oppose the annexation actively.[9] Russia successfully controlled Ukraine’s psychological resolve to wage a forceful struggle by exploiting fracture within Ukrainian society and manipulating perceptions. As evidence, the head of the Ukrainian intelligence service (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny [SBU]) presented a report during a decisive meeting that the military and security forces were demoralized and refusing to accept the idea of the interim government as a result of the leader’s unwillingness to take action from the escalation.[10]

            Aside from the Sun Tzu theory, another significant idea that provides valuable insight is the theory of Clausewitz, “cunning.” This notion implies a secret purpose; the plans and order were primarily intended for deceptive purposes since they were designed to mislead the adversary via disseminating false information and action.[11] Russia deliberately shrouded its efforts in secrecy, creating a thick fog of war that obscured its true intentions. One of the Russian pretexts for deploying forces in the Ukraine border region is implementing a large-scale force exercise that has been regularly conducted since 2013.[12] Moreover, The main component of this deceit was Russia’s assertion that its action was meant to defend the rights and interests of the Russian-speaking community in Crimea.[13] This narrative served to justify its military presence and action in the minds of some domestically and internationally. Therefore, this has delayed the Ukrainian side’s response due to confusion among Ukrainian leadership regarding the Russians’ true intentions. Moreover, it is too late for Ukraine to recognize that Russian forces have surrounded Crimea and sealed it off from the mainland.

            Finally, Clausewitz’s theory of the culminating point is the final explanation for the annexation of Crimea. In military strategy, the culminating point is the point at which the advantages of a military operation start to wane, and additional efforts provide decreasing returns.[14] Russia's strategy in annexing Crimea seems to be intended to prevent getting to that point. Russia achieved its goals without participating in a protracted conflict by implementing its strategy swiftly and effectively. For instance, the previously scheduled referendum on independence for May 25 had been moved up to March 16.[15] This strategy enabled Russia to exploit the element of surprise and reclaim the initiative before international actors could formulate a coherent response. Avoiding a prolonged campaign also helps Russia minimize potential risks, such as casualties, economic strain, or political backlash. In addition to accelerating the implementation of the mission, Russia had also implemented mitigation measures to prevent a counterattack from Ukraine as a result of the culmination point by deploying long-range anti-access and area-denial capabilities in northern Crimea.[16]

            Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is a compelling case study that underscores the enduring applicability of timeless military and strategic theories as expounded by Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. This invasion exemplified Sun Tzu’s idea of opportunism, where Russia capitalized on a moment of vulnerability within Ukraine’s political landscape to swiftly advance its interest in Crimea. Concurrently, the effective subjugation of Ukraine’s will through psychological warfare mirrored Sun Tzu’s principles. Moreover, Clausewitz’s theory of cunning was demonstrated in Russia’s use of deception, creating a shroud of uncertainty that delayed the adversary’s responses and effectively sealed off Crimea. In line with Clausewitz’s concept of the culmination point, avoiding a protracted conflict allowed Russia to secure its objectives while minimizing risks. The annexation of Crimea is deeply rooted in the principles of opportunism, subduing the enemy’s will, cunning, and avoiding the culmination point. From studying the case of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, we can learn the characteristics of the Russian war strategy that we can use as a reference in the future. However, all possibilities must still be considered; Clausewitz explains, “War in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war.”[17] Because the situation and conditions in a war are always dynamic.

  

NOTES

I want to thank our Military Theory Instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier, and all the students of Flight 17 for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found therein are my own.

---

[1] Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Etc. Oxford University Press, 1963, 79.

[2] Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017, 11.

[3] Ibid, 30.

[4] Ibid, 12.

[5] Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Etc. Oxford University Press, 1963, 85.

[6] Ibid, 92.

[7] Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017, 1.

[8] Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Etc. Oxford University Press, 1963, 39.

[9] Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017, 28-29.

[10] Ibid, 19.

[11] Clausewitz, Carl V. On War: Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie. 1976, 202.

[12] Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017, 8.

[13] Ibid, 13.

[14] Clausewitz, Carl V. On War: Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie. 1976, 528.

[15] Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017, 10.

[16] Ibid, 25

[17] Clausewitz, Carl V. On War: Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie. 1976, 593.