Minggu, 08 Oktober 2023

Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's Theories on Russia's 2014 Operation to Annex Crimea

Major Dolly J. P. Hutagalung/Flight 13/MT-601E/September 15th, 2023 

In February 2014, the actions of Russia against Ukraine shocked the international community. Nobody expected Russia to be able to annex the Crimean Peninsula without facing considerable opposition from the Ukrainian government. However, those who understand war theory could forecast this behavior based on earlier signs. This is why we study the history and theory of war to recognize its symptoms so that we can either avoid it or, in the worst-case scenario, be prepared to confront it. The Russian military effort to take over Crimea is one example of an international conflict we may learn from. Russia's effective annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrates Sun Tzu's military theory of deception, and Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war as an extension of politics still has relevance in contemporary times.

Sun Tzu said, “All warfare is based on deception.”[i]. This theory becomes quite pertinent when considering the happenings in Crimea, starting with the preparations for the Russian operation. One of the deception theories is to strike where he is vulnerable and sneak up on him when he least expects it.[ii] Since 2013, Russia has routinely requested more significant snap readiness assessments and simultaneous drills.[iii] Russia disguised its original intent as a routine military exercise but progressively moved its troops closer to the region of Crimea while simultaneously preparing for the operation. Additionally, in February and March of 2014, Russia hosted the Winter Olympics in Sochi, so the Southern Military District was already in a state of elevated readiness to support this activity.[iv] With an event as significant as the Olympics, a high level of military preparedness in the region seems natural. However, because Sochi is close to the Crimean Peninsula, troops can be moved anytime for operational purposes. Russia adopted the deception theory in preparation for the Crimea operation, which avoided the attention of the Ukrainian government and the rest of the world.

            Moreover, Russia's strategy of deception persisted throughout the operation and on multiple levels. Starting on a tactical level, the Russians deceived the local populace into believing they were either native self-defense forces or indigenous police units.[v] This made Crimea's residents unconcerned with Russian armed forces undertaking military operations since they reside under regular conditions; consequently, Russian personnel in disguise could easily carry out their missions. On an operational level, Russia misled Ukraine's leadership about Russia's genuine objectives and delayed a Ukrainian reaction.[vi] Despite being aware of Russian forces in Crimea, the Ukrainian government failed to assess their intentions, leading to policies that benefited Russia and worsened the situation. On a strategic level, the West misconstrued Russian denial efforts as an attempt to negotiate a political settlement to de-escalate rather than annex the peninsula.[vii] International parties did not foresee that the end state of Russia's operations would not only increase its political influence in Europe but also its territorial claims. Russia's deception strategy was successful on multiple levels and brought it closer to attaining its political objectives in the region with military power.

            The fall of Crimea to Russian control cannot be separated from Russia's regional political objectives, which align with Clausewitz's view of war as a continuation of politics. Clausewitz said that war is a genuine political instrument, continuing political discourse by other means.[viii] Protests occurred in Kyiv's main square, the Maidan, in the fall of 2013 after the Ukrainian president decided not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership program.[ix] The Ukrainian president's choice demonstrates that his political position was more pro-Russian than the EU, representing the West. The forceful removal of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office resulted in a loss of Russian influence in Ukraine, severely impacting Russian geopolitics in Europe. As a result, the Russian leader quickly used the instrument of power by conducting military operations in Crimea to secure Russia’s political interests.

            Furthermore, the Russian government employed military force to sway political conditions in Crimea for Moscow's benefit. The referendum on Russia's accession was hastily organized and improvised, with local officials being rounded up by paramilitaries, ultimately becoming the political instrument for annexing the peninsula.[x] Russia was able to influence Crimean authorities during the referendum process, while the original plan for May 25 changed multiple times before being implemented on March 16. Russia's primary objective is to organize the referendum by directing Crimea to join the Russian Federation using military force. As described by Clausewitz, military force is a continuation of a country's political policy. Russia actively exploited its military force to influence its political decisions, as the Crimea annexation operation demonstrated.

In conclusion, the 2014 Russian operation in Crimea showed how military theory and strategy may still be used to understand and resolve modern wars. Sun Tzu’s theory of warfare as deception and Clausewitz’s theory of fighting for political purposes is relevant in assessing Russia’s operation of annexing Crimea in 2014. The crisis in Crimea should be used as a learning experience by all sides so that we can foresee it in the future and prevent it from happening anywhere else. Moreover, by studying the theory of war, we will understand a problem comprehensively, allowing us to make prudent choices that will profoundly impact our country and the world. Finally, we can advance the war theory by combining our knowledge and experience so that the perspective is increasingly applicable to the potential conflicts we will confront in the future.

  

 

Notes

        I wish to thank our Course Instructor, Wing Commander Robin J. Kemp, Maj. Christina Hayhurst, Maj.  Christopher Nguyen, Maj. Joyce Neef, Indonesian Air Force officers, and all students of Flight 13 for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found therein are my own.

[i]. Sun Tzu, "Estimates," in The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 66-69.

 [ii].  Ibid. 69.

 [iii]. Michael Kofman et al., "Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine," 2017, 8, doi:10.7249/rr1498.

 [iv]. Ibid, 18.

 [v]. Ibid, 23.

 [vi]. Ibid, 23-24.

 [vii]. Ibid, 24.

 [viii].  Carl V. Clausewitz, "What Is War?," in On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87-88.

 [ix]. Kofman, " Russia's Operations in Crimea," 1.

 [x]. Ibid, 10-11.



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